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Topic: Restoring Canadian military (Read 659 times)
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Jesse Reed
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New book argues Canada's freeloading and anti-Americanism threatens our future.
Every so often, a book comes along that's so powerful it demands to be read.
What makes history professor Jack Granatstein's new book, Whose War Is It?, riveting, is that it's as timely as tomorrow and underlines where Canada has gone wrong, where it needs correcting, and dares challenge conventional dogma.
For those who think Canada is doing everything right, and needs no correcting, consider that our influence on the world stage has steadily diminished since World War II, that we've developed something of a reputation for self-satisfaction, of not pulling our weight on global issues, and -- until Afghanistan -- we were freeloaders in collective defence.
In this relatively short (231 pages), succinct book, Granatstein takes us to task -- justifying it by borrowing the remark of fellow historian Michael Bliss that he's reached that point in life (60 books) where he can reflect on life and make observations about what he considers the key problems in Canada's foreign and defence policies.
Big "L" Liberals and much of the media glitterati will hate it. He cites those in the Toronto Star, CBC, Globe and Mail and in politics who are examples of the Canadian mindset of pervasive anti-Americanism he calls "a disease, a virus that has spread so deeply into the body politic it threatens -- at last -- to anger the nation on whom Canada depends for its economic viability and defence."
He calls the sort of anti-Americanism dispensed by the CBC and Toronto Star "madness," and sees Liberals "becoming each day more like the New Democratic Party and Bloc Quebecois in their foreign and defence policies." (I'd argue that "ordinary" Canadians are not as anti-American as are those who have access to the microphone.)
This Canadian "disease," coupled with the illogical lust to be "neutral" in international issues, has been exacerbated in recent years by politicians like Jean Chretien, Lloyd Axworthy and Bill Graham stressing "Canadian values" over "national interests" in international matters.
"We do not even have national issues," he writes, "but only values such as tolerance, gender equality, multiculturalism ... and general all-around wholesomeness." In fact, national interests are what should guide a country's relations -- meaning you deal with tyrannies and democracies according to your national interests -- like trade with China even though it may harvest and sell the organs of prisoners and dissenters.
The previous Liberal government's hostility towards the U.S. was not only folly, but wrong. Our "national interest" should have persuaded us to participate in continental missile defence (rejected by Paul Martin) because the Americans are going to do it anyway, and without us, they steal our sovereignty.
Worst since Harding
Granatstein thinks we should have supported the war in Iraq -- not with troops (which we don't have), but support for the goals. Paradoxically, Granatstein seems to want it both ways. While advocating support for America, in his "considered opinion, George W. Bush is the worst president of United States since Warren Harding" in the early 1920s. He cites Hurricane Katrina, the environment, and the war on terror as evidence of Bush's hopelessness.
Our "national interests, are issues like security, unity, economics, democracy and freedom -- not "compassionate" issues like tsunami relief, aid to Haiti, Darfur, banning landmines (which 44 countries ignore) and emotional causes that change like the weather.
For years, "peacekeeping" was seen as the priority and heritage of our military -- always untrue, and finally being corrected -- though Granatstein sees endemic pacifism in Quebec as a sore issue. He notes that of 48 infantry battalions that fought at Vimy Ridge in World War I, only one -- the VanDoos -- was from Quebec.
In wars, our military has always exceeded expectations, but since peacekeeping after Suez in 1956, a succession of governments gnawed away at our military until it was incapable of fighting a war.
Granatstein mocks peacekeeping, and implies Lt.-Gen. Tommy Burns, who commanded UN troops in Gaza, was more interested in his mistress (reportedly an Israeli spy) than his troops, which will surprise some who were there.
Clear outline
Granatstein outlines the plight of our military and foreign and domestic policy clearly and persuasively.
Still, it might be recalled that much of the time when our military was being undermined, Granatstein seemed to many to be defending whatever the military status quo of the day was. Now he sees the Harper government as restoring our military to its traditional role.
In summary, this is an excellent book. Even some repetition is invaluable for understanding our country. One hopes Harper remains firm and doesn't start chasing opinion polls, as politicians are wont to do.
Jesse
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Jesse Reed
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ranrad
Ron [Andy] Andrews
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Well, a really good write up here Jesse. I thank you much for your research and input, and in many things do agree with what you have said. It may be that some of our historians are a bit bent to be affected by politics, and of course they must be, and are left to struggle with how they perceive everything. I will check out this book. It sounds very interesting and amybe enlightening as regards our great country, ranrad
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RCAF,CAF, converted RCR?,1RCR 74-77 CD: SSM (Nato);CPSM,;UN-Cyp.; UN- Golan
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Mike Blais
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A ROYAL CANADIAN "NEVER PASSES A FAULT"
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Interesting....
Hawks get bucks to sell war
University centres hot on Afghan peace get left out of federal funding loop
By PAUL WEINBERG
With the the release last week of the Senate's oddly contradictory report on Canada's Kandahar mission, the country is once again awash in foreign policy polemics. But can we really have a fair Afghanistan debate when so many of the sources we rely on for info are bankrolled by the Department of National Defence (DND)?
That's the worry of peace studies experts who point out that a disproportionate number of those quoted by the media or penning op-eds on foreign affairs hail from the 14 defence, international studies and military history programs across the country receiving DND dole-outs.
Peter Langille, a University of Western Ontario professor specializing in conflict resolution, has a word for the scholarly recipients of such funds: "embedded.'' He's critical of the federal department's $2.5 million yearly Security and Defence Forum (SDF) program, which shells out for research.
"It has a near monopoly over discussion and programs not only of defence issues, but also IR [international relations studies] within Canadian academe,'' he says, referring to the prevalence of a paradigm inclined toward a long war policy and expansion of the military sector.
It's a worry shared by Mark Vorobej, acting director at the Centre for Peace Studies at McMaster University. The problem for conflict resolution programs everywhere, Vorobej says, is that they don't have powerful allies but instead have to shuffle along on ad hoc funding and indifference from university administrations.
"We have a solid track record of delivering a substantial bang for the miserly buck the university gives us, but after 17 years, we still do have not a single faculty position,'' says Vorobej, referring to the fact his centre's academic instructors are seconded.
Things are certainly lusher at the SDF-supported Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary, headed by the oft-quoted David Bercuson, who champions a stronger defence sector and a sustained war against the Taliban. The last 18 months, he admits, have been good ones for advocates of military preparedness. "I'd like to think that we have had some impact on government thinking, both the previous government's and the current one's,'' he says.
It's the same sense of satisfaction expressed by Queen's University's Doug Bland, chair of the DND-financed defence management studies program. He helped edit Canada Without Armed Forces?, which was instrumental in a $12.8 billion bump in military expenditures over the next five years in the 2005 federal budget.
Have proponents of a stronger military been able to set the tone?, I ask him. "Oh, absolutely," says Bland, "in fact, I just got off the phone for an hour with somebody from CanWest News. The media come to us almost all the time looking for background.''
Kim Richard Nossal, head of political science at Queen's and a member of a committee that decides which centres get SDF funding, believes Langille has got it terribly wrong. But he does admit that defence academics tend not to stray too far from politics as they are now arranged. "At one level Peter is correct. There are very few people who do defence studies from a radical perspective, that is, non-mainstream and critical of the government's perspective.''
One such "non-mainstream'' scholar is University of British Columbia's Michael Byers, an international law expert who's been critical of Canada's current Afghan mission. He talks about the potentially "chilling'' impact DND munificence can have on academic research. That's why he says he maintains a distance from the SDF funds flowing into the campus's Liu Institute for Global Issues, where he is academic director.
"Out of respect for my colleagues' freedom of decision making, the only steps I've taken are (a) not to use or benefit from the SDF money, and (b) to request that my name not be listed as part of the UBC stable of experts on applications for renewal of the funding."
Not all of the SDF centres, however, are exactly alike. York's Centre for International and Security Studies, for one, promotes itself as more critical theory-oriented in areas like international relations than others. Last year, it had to go through considerable negotiation to fit the new scholarly priorities of DND, which include failed states, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and Canada-U.S. defence.
"There were very, very few references in York's proposal to the word 'defence,'" says DND's Aaron Hywarren, who says SDF gets a thousand inquiries a year from reporters seeking quotes from its subsidized academics.
David Dewitt, former director of the York centre, defends DND cash as a way of fostering new scholarship, but he is concerned nonetheless about a "narrowing" of the SDF criteria.
"The situation right now between the Department of National Defence and the pressure of the SDF group on academics is problematic and troubling, but is, perhaps, one of those things that will change when there is a change in government,'' he says.
This is not to say that all defence scholars are wont to bolster the military quotient of Canada's foreign policy. It's just that those who don't have a difficult time, as Walter Dorn, a prof at the Canadian Forces College (affiliated with the DND's Royal Military College) has discovered.
Last March, Dorn found himself in the middle of a controversy when the Minister of Defence received complaints about his articles lamenting the demise of peacekeeping. The college's principal stood up for Dorn's academic freedom. The armed forces, Dorn says, resents "the public's view that our soldiers are peacekeepers."
But if not all military studies folk are hawkish, not all hawks get SDF funds for their research. Take the case of Jack Granatstein, York U professor emeritus and board member of the Canadian Defense and Foreign Affairs Institute. He is near the top of the list of military experts quoted by the media, according a study by independent defence analyst Steven Staples.
(Staples's survey, which doesn't include the Globe and Mail, concludes that from February to September 2006, General Lewis Mackenzie was quoted 224 times in the press, Granatstein 133, the Conference of Defence Associations 96, the Mackenzie Institute 63 and Bercuson 56. Staples himself was the only conflict resolution expert to rate, with 126.)
Granatstein, along with Bercuson, pushes an agenda that includes closer Canada/U.S. military co-operation and an abandonment of peacekeeping. But despite his high profile, he is demure. "I wish I had more influence," Granatstein says, chuckling on the phone. He is working on a new lobby org, Canadians for Defence and Security, aimed specifically at countering peace advocates like Staples.
Staples, however, is doing some retrenching of his own, setting up a new think tank, the Rideau Institute. "My concern is that this intolerance for any discussion of policy that deviates from the priorities of the brass is spreading into the general public." the end
STUDYING WAR
Recipients of the Department of National Defence's SDF funds in 2005-06
York University $120,000
Wilfrid Laurier University $95,000
University of Manitoba $100,000
University of British Columbia $120,000
University of Calgary $120,000
Dalhousie University $120,000
University of New Brunswick $55,000
Université Laval $95,000
Université de Montréal and McGill University $100,000
Université du Québec à Montréal and Concordia University $120,000
Queen's University $290,000
Carleton University $120,000
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1RCR 1977-79 Depot (Italy PL), B Coy, Mortars, Pioneers, D Coy (CFB London)
3RCR 1979-82 M Coy, Pipes & Drums, Sigs, Mortars. (CFB Baden-Soellingen)
1RCR 1982-88 Mortars. Dukes, Cyprus-Welfare NCO 84-85, Injured, WO&Sgts Mess, (CFB London)
1988-92 Med-remuster to HELL/ 35 DU, CFB Baden
1992 Medical release. God Bless you all!
Pro Patria
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Jesse Reed
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Congratulation Mike another good report keep up the good work you also do a super job keeping us posted on the regimens activities in Afghanistan.
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Jesse Reed
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george burrows
redpatch43
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Thanks to Jesse Reed and Mike for the two new items addded re SDF FUNDSETC AND REBUILDONG OUR ARMY. Both are excellent articles and appear to be vewry wise info. George.
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Mike Blais
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A ROYAL CANADIAN "NEVER PASSES A FAULT"
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Heres one from Jack for those interested.
Ready, aim, fire an emergency round of cash at the Forces
J.L. GRANATSTEIN
These should be good times at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa. The Conservative government has followed through on many of its pledges for new equipment, and the lengthy procurement process is in train to acquire long-range air transports, new Hercules C-130J medium-range transports, medium-lift helicopters, and trucks. The announced cost for such programs is $17-billion, a huge sum by any calculation, one that holds out the promise of transforming the obsolescent, money-starved Forces.
So, why is no one cheering? There are three major problems, all complicated to explain, but all absolutely critical for the future survival of Canada's military.
The first is something called the accrual system of accounting. In the past, Canadian governments bought a truck for $25,000 and charged that sum to a department's budget. The costs of gas, oil, and maintenance five, 10, and 20 years down the road were charged to future budgets. In accrual accounting, perhaps more reasonably, the costs of operating the truck 20 years into the future are charged to today's budget. That $25,000 truck now becomes a $125,000 charge on this year's budget funding.
This matters. Consider the four C-17s the Harper government has agreed to buy. Each of the huge transports costs about $250-million. The accrual cost, again in round numbers, is $4-billion. Many Canadians remain unaware of the change in accounting methodology, and government rules (or practice) do not appear to permit explanation. So a $1-billion purchase of necessary equipment appears to many as a $4-billion boondoggle. It's not, but it's a hard sell for all of us whose eyes glaze over at the mention of accountants' rules. The answer, of course, is to explain defence purchases (and purchases in every other government department, as well) by making it clear that the total lifetime package is included in the announced sum.
The second problem is that the $17-billion in promised equipment purchases naturally enough makes Canadians believe money is flowing in a torrent to the military. So it is, but only after a fashion. Equipment purchases are never final until they are contracted, built, and put into the hands of the troops. Governments can change and, with them, priorities. The Navy needed helicopters to replace the aged Sea Kings back in the 1980s, and the contract for those machines was carved in stone -- until Jean Chrétien came to power in 1993 and killed the deal. In other words, it ain't over till it's over; in Canada, that means until the military actually begins operating the equipment. A minority government situation does not provide much certainty that today's equipment promises will fare any better than the promised helicopters of 1993.
The third problem has to do with the Afghan war and its impact on the budgets of the Canadian Forces. No one can say with confidence what extra costs the Kandahar operation is imposing on the military, but they are substantial -- certainly well above $1-billion a year. Most of this money seems to be coming from the existing budgets of the Department of National Defence, and the difficulty is that the Army, Navy, and Air Force are being forced to scramble to keep themselves operating as funds (and personnel) are pared away to support the mission.
The Navy made the front pages a few weeks ago when it tied up ships in Halifax and Esquimalt because it had run out of operating funds in fiscal year 2006-07, and would not have any more until fiscal year 2007-08 began. That was an unwise, partly political, ploy by the Navy's commanders, to be sure, but the problem is all too real. The operations and maintenance budgets of all three service environments are stretched to the breaking point now, and every discussion at NDHQ has to do with what core capabilities can be slashed today to keep the machine going tomorrow.
There is a terrible irony here. Canada is fighting a war in Kandahar and its soldiers are performing superbly. New equipment is being ordered and the future of the Canadian Forces looks brighter today than at any time for the past 40 years. But at the same time, funds are so scarce, the military can scarcely operate its ships, aircraft, and trucks and is being forced to consider slashing key functions to stay alive. The Forces' funding simply does not allow it to do everything it must -- the present cannot be sacrificed if the future is to be achieved.
There is only one answer: The Harper government must supplement the Canadian Forces' operations and maintenance funding now. An emergency appropriation of $1-billion will keep the military running at home and keep the soldiers in Kandahar supplied with what they need. Anything less and the government risks destroying the kudos it has deservedly won for its efforts to rebuild the Forces. The military might not survive, either.
Historian J. L. Granatstein writes on behalf of the Council for Canadian Security in the 21st Century.
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1RCR 1977-79 Depot (Italy PL), B Coy, Mortars, Pioneers, D Coy (CFB London)
3RCR 1979-82 M Coy, Pipes & Drums, Sigs, Mortars. (CFB Baden-Soellingen)
1RCR 1982-88 Mortars. Dukes, Cyprus-Welfare NCO 84-85, Injured, WO&Sgts Mess, (CFB London)
1988-92 Med-remuster to HELL/ 35 DU, CFB Baden
1992 Medical release. God Bless you all!
Pro Patria
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george burrows
redpatch43
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Way to go Mike. an very true EXCELLENT article. Keep it going
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Mike Blais
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A ROYAL CANADIAN "NEVER PASSES A FAULT"
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Thanks G. Here is an Interesting read....
Lives lost, lessons learned
GLORIA GALLOWAY
Five years ago this month, the first Canadian soldiers arrived in Afghanistan to begin their first real combat mission in decades. The deployment came after nearly 10 years of cuts by a federal government that was more focused on deficit reduction than military expansion. As they grappled with the transition from peacekeeping to conventional warfare, the Canadian Forces have learned many hard lessons, particularly about the state and capabilities of its equipment. GLORIA GALLOWAY describes some of the more pointed examples.
David Bercuson, Alexander Moens, Wesley Wark, Scott Taylor and Richard Martin
Lesson No. 1. Transport
The problem: People and supplies must travel far from their base camps over dangerous roads to reach the outposts where Canadians patrol. The Taliban know that trucks heading to the front will eventually return, setting a perfect stage for an ambush. So Canada, which has no heavy-lift helicopters in the theatre, must borrow rides from allies such as the Americans and Dutch.
The solution: The federal government is spending $2.7-billion to buy and maintain 16 Chinook helicopters and has requested urgent delivery because they are deemed so essential to the Afghan mission. That is a huge change since 1992, when Chinooks were declared unnecessary after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Canada sold its fleet of 12 to the Dutch for $2.25-million apiece. (The military won't confirm if those helicopters are the same ones currently being borrowed to ferry Canadians in Kandahar.) In the meantime, Canada has been relying on an aging fleet of Hercules cargo planes that require many hours of maintenance to stay airworthy. Canada is perhaps the only country in Afghanistan that supplies its troops with a manoeuvre called a low-altitude parachute extraction drop. The Hercules skims several metres above the ground with its rear door open and the cargo, attached to a parachute, is pushed out.
Lesson No. 2. Jeep patrols
Print Edition - Section Front
The problem: The first Canadian troops in Afghanistan patrolled the streets of Kabul in Iltis jeeps, a military variant of a commercial vehicle with little protective reinforcement. Military commanders boasted that, because the jeeps were not heavily protected, they projected an image of confidence in the region's stability. In October, 2003, two Canadians were killed when their Iltis hit an anti-tank mine. Less than four months later, another soldier was killed when a suicide bomber jumped on the hood of the Iltis in which he was riding.
The solution: The Iltises were replaced by the armour-plated G-Wagons. The G-Wagon was a quantum leap over the Iltis, but some analysts say it still doesn't provide the protection required against suicide bombers and land mines. Canada has also sent over light-armoured vehicles, or LAV-IIIs. But even the original LAVs were not reinforced to the standard required in Afghanistan, so the armour has been bolstered to give them added protection. They can move very fast over difficult roads and troops love them. But they have, on occasion, tipped over. In March, 2006, a LAV-III was hit by a taxi and toppled off the road, killing one soldier. It is not completely bombproof or mineproof. And soldiers require large amounts of training to use them effectively.
Lesson No. 3. Tanks
The problem: Through the 1990s, the Canadian military questioned the usefulness of tanks. The lumbering machines were of little value in peacekeeping operations and most experts felt future wars would not be land combats. Tanks may be expensive, difficult to maintain and hard on gas supplies, but in Afghanistan, the military needed armoured protection capable of driving over rutted fields and plowing over walls. And it needed serious firepower.
The solution: Canada sent 15 Leopard tanks to the war zone this past September. Tanks are imposing symbols of power. While the Leopards are not meant for long-range fire, they can punch a hole in a mud-walled compound from 500 metres away. Canada also thought its M113 troop carriers were outdated even though about one-third of them had been lengthened and strengthened in the late 1990s. In Afghanistan, the large, boxy, tracked vehicle is an excellent means of getting soldiers to (and through) villages that may be Taliban haunts. When Canadian troops battle an enemy that lives in what amounts to a medieval society, they have learned that old-fashioned weapons have a place.
Lesson No. 4. Reconnaissance
The problem: In 2002, Canada had no easy way of monitoring the movement of the Taliban, who could hide in compounds and congregate in locations that were beyond the soldiers' easy watch.
The solution: Canada bought drones: remote-controlled miniature flying platforms for surveillance systems. At first, they didn't work very well. Several crashed on landing or on takeoff. Today, they are critical tools for gaining information in an urban war zone because they can fly over buildings and look behind walls, bringing back risk-free reconnaissance. They are also hard to hit from the ground and provide excellent imagery. In addition, the Canadian military makes much use of its Coyotes, reconnaissance and intelligence vehicles that one analyst describes as being worth their weight in gold. Their surveillance systems are designed to detect hostile forces using a combination of cameras, radar, thermal imaging and laser range-finding equipment.
Lesson No. 5. Tracking the enemy
The problem: Regardless of how much state-of-the-art equipment Canada sends to Afghanistan, the Taliban has found ways to defeat it. The enemy knows its way around the country in a way that Canadian troops never will. Checkpoints have been passed by old men on bikes who turned out to be suicide bombers.
The solution: Western armies use satellite images to pinpoint the enemy. But they have also learned that, when fighting an insurgency, some old-fashioned techniques work best. In Afghanistan, many military experts argue that the best way to determine an enemy's location is to keep going until the Taliban start to shoot. But Western armies maintain superiority after sundown because the NATO allies, including Canada, are far ahead of the Taliban when it comes to night-vision equipment. In the air, the Americans have much improved their night-sight capabilities since 2002, when they accidentally bombed Canadians taking part in an after-dark training exercise, killing four soldiers. And on the ground, Canadian troops can see movement at night from 1,500 metres away using specially equipped goggles.
Lesson No. 6. Artillery
The problem: Just as Western countries believed that tanks were no longer useful, so too were conventional guns deemed outdated. That type of thinking led Canada to get rid of its 155-mm, self-propelled M109 howitzers -- large, easily transportable guns that can hit targets up to 30 kilometres away. But then came Afghanistan and the realization that on treeless terrain, where troops are exposed, that kind of firepower would be extremely useful.
The solution: New types of artillery, called M777s, were ordered post-haste. They are extremely accurate, can be used with GPS-guided shells and have excellent range and reliability. They are a good negotiation tool; in trying to persuade Afghans not to help the Taliban, Canadians can demonstrate the consequences of bad behaviour by radioing to a launcher many kilometres away, and suddenly the Afghan farmer is left with a large hole in his field and a new appreciation of NATO firepower. Then there is the P90, a handheld submachine gun with a needle-nosed bullet that cuts through body armour that has proven its worth in tight spaces, like the close walls of an Afghan compound. It has been in use since 1994 but has proven much more valuable in combat situations than on peacekeeping tours. All kinds of firepower are useful in modern-day conventional warfare of the type being fought in Afghanistan.
This material was filed with the assistance of David Bercuson, director of the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary; Alexander Moens, who teaches international relations at the Simon Fraser University; Wesley Wark, a security expert at the University of Toronto's Munk Centre for International Studies; Scott Taylor, editor of the military magazine Esprit de Corps; and Richard Martin, the president of Alvera Consulting Inc., who previously served with the military in the Directorate of Land (Equipment) Requirements and other departments.
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1RCR 1977-79 Depot (Italy PL), B Coy, Mortars, Pioneers, D Coy (CFB London)
3RCR 1979-82 M Coy, Pipes & Drums, Sigs, Mortars. (CFB Baden-Soellingen)
1RCR 1982-88 Mortars. Dukes, Cyprus-Welfare NCO 84-85, Injured, WO&Sgts Mess, (CFB London)
1988-92 Med-remuster to HELL/ 35 DU, CFB Baden
1992 Medical release. God Bless you all!
Pro Patria
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ranrad
Ron [Andy] Andrews
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Good stuff here Mike , they make a good read and think we would all be advised to read them...gives a good insite into what is really happening with the operationg of our military and how precarious things really are.. thanks Mike, ranrad
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RCAF,CAF, converted RCR?,1RCR 74-77 CD: SSM (Nato);CPSM,;UN-Cyp.; UN- Golan
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george burrows
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To Vic Arsenault:
Very Sorry Vic to have to say that I did not know Jim Allison. Of course to be fair, I did not know most of the regiment because I joined the regiment in early 1043 while in Scotland. I was in "D"coy - 17 Plt. I only had tiime to get to know some of D coy men prior to the invasion.
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george burrows
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Mike: Yes I agree, that last article is really good by Gloria Galloway. I'm very impressed. she calls it the way it is. Sounds just like a Political type article. Only shows how "Dumb" politicians think. No wonder we are so much in deb't all the time.
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Mike Blais
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A ROYAL CANADIAN "NEVER PASSES A FAULT"
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Heres something...
Decades of darkness
Idris Ben-Tahir
Citizen Special
Monday, March 05, 2007
CREDIT: File photo, The Canadian Press
Gen. Rick Hillier talks about a "decade of darkness" for the Canadian Forces in the 1990s, but the military's terrible problems date back to the 1960s, Idris Ben-Tahir writes. Then-defence-minister Paul Hellyer, shown here with a sailor, combined all three branches of the Forces in 1968, and it was all downhill from there.
'A decade of darkness" is how Gen. Rick Hillier, Canada's chief of the defence staff, recently described the harm done to Canadian Forces' capability by budgetary retrenchments under the previous Liberal administration.
The remarks were controversial, but in fact it's worse than that. The armed forces' decay started four decades ago on Feb. 1, 1968, when defence minister Paul Hellyer integrated the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force into a single service, which experts said was sheer lunacy. Four admirals resigned.
In 1945 we had the world's third-largest navy; today it resembles Sir Wilfrid Laurier's 1910 acquisition of HMCS Niobe and Rainbow -- "the tinpot navy." Our surface fleet is tied to the docks and the submarines stagnate from their outmoded design.
In the 1960s the army had six regular infantry regiments, but now only the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, the Royal Canadian Regiment and the Royal 22nd Regiment (The Van Doos) remain. We juggle, or rather recycle, the soldiers constantly to meet our international obligations.
Our air force has not fared well either. During the 20th century (1924-99) we had 179 different types of aircraft. Since the 1968 integration, we added 21 types but de-commissioned 33. Helicopters are falling out off the skies: In November 1993, prime minister Jean Chretien cancelled the Merlin (EH-101), an abrogation that cost us billions of dollars. The Cormorant, its replacement, pales compared to the former's capability.
During the long Cold War, there were three radar nets strung across the breadth of our country: Pinetree, Mid-Canada and Distant Early Warning (DEW) lines, alerting about any intrusion into our airspace. The Prairies churned out legions of pilots and navigators for various missions to protect the world's second-largest country in area, juxtaposed between two superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union, each armed to their gills with intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Fighter-interceptors: Canucks, Voodoos and Hornets scrambled to verify a "bogey" unknown, or checkmate a "bandit" intruding Soviet bomber, escorting it out of our airspace. Nearly 150 Canadian pilots were killed during the phantom Cold War.
Long-range patrol aircraft: Argus and Aurora skimmed the oceans' surfaces at a 10-metre altitude hunting submarines lurking ominously around our longest coastline in the world, buzzing vessels disguised as fishing trawlers and conducting sovereignty flights over the North.
Air Transport Command lauded itself as the world's finest airline for its airlift, its capability to deploy our forces anywhere in the world with an unsurpassed safety record of never losing a passenger. Its search-and-rescue (SAR) aircraft saved many, many lives over our great expanse. Now, we have to lease Soviet-era cargo planes to do half of the tasks.
The decay has gone beyond materiel to morale. In 1968 the Canadian Airborne Regiment was formed and performed admirably until its 1995 disbandment, sparked by a hazing incident, that included relieving, through a press release, Maj.-Gen. Brian Vernon of his command for not alerting superiors of the suspect video. This sacking illustrated the state of decay the Canadian Forces had reached.
It was even a more abysmal moment when the chief of defence staff, Gen. Jean Boyle, left his office unceremoniously, with paparazzi chasing his staff car, as he tendered his resignation on Oct. 8, 1996. A parliamentary enquiry had grilled him for details of the Somali teenager's death. The Canadian Airborne Regiment, trained for offensive action, had been wrongly deployed for peacekeeping. Although the chief of defence staff bore the brunt, military morale suffered irreparably.
Gen. Hillier, as chief of defence staff, inherited in 2005 a quagmire, with the Canadian Forces embroiled in a peacekeeping mission with a twist -- an interminable insurgency. He has demonstrated leadership. To bolster morale he inspects the front, messes (eats) their rations, and bivouacs (sleeps) in the trenches. He is a soldier's soldier. But when it comes to materiel, he is at the mercy of his political masters.
As opposition leader John Diefenbaker said, the armed forces were a "Hellyer of a mess." Now Gen. Hillier is tasked to undo that mess.
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1RCR 1977-79 Depot (Italy PL), B Coy, Mortars, Pioneers, D Coy (CFB London)
3RCR 1979-82 M Coy, Pipes & Drums, Sigs, Mortars. (CFB Baden-Soellingen)
1RCR 1982-88 Mortars. Dukes, Cyprus-Welfare NCO 84-85, Injured, WO&Sgts Mess, (CFB London)
1988-92 Med-remuster to HELL/ 35 DU, CFB Baden
1992 Medical release. God Bless you all!
Pro Patria
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ranrad
Ron [Andy] Andrews
Ultimate 2000+ Member
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Posts: 2331
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Hey Mike, dang good recap of the era you have here..thanks for getting it up.. although i am by no means any kind of expert in the subject, many of us regular soldiers had a good idea of what it would takje. once my own brother, a civvy , asked me ,"Well what do you think it would cost to get the military properly funded and equipment updated"? I quicklty answeres , " We dont have enough money in this country to do it, and any attempt would take years and waste a lot of tax money with mistakes of purchases becaue the gov , has a propensity to NOT listen to our military people... so ,here we are ... hope we can do it, but they need to " listen ' to the military in order to get whats needed and that to me is that.....ranrad
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RCAF,CAF, converted RCR?,1RCR 74-77 CD: SSM (Nato);CPSM,;UN-Cyp.; UN- Golan
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