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Topic: Afghanistan - 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment - 2006-2007 (Read 15648 times)
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Tim McCully
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PS: I don't beleive i can do this alone and i would not want this to be in any way about me! My first intention was for it to be about the troops of course, but secondly about our fine RCR Association and the hard work and effort put forth to keep our history alive.
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1RCR (82-88) B coy 6pl, (84-85) UNFICYP- BBC coy Tpt, C coy 9pl, E coy Mortars, (88-90) CFB Halifax Base Chief's Staff, CFB Trenton Refinisher Tech.(90-92). UNFICYP,CPSM
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ranrad
Ron [Andy] Andrews
Ultimate 2000+ Member
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Well Tim, it is coming full circle, good ideas do that, and i offer whatever help i can be, including joining the walk in this area, Vernon,BC...there is already a local fella who has ,with his group had a Red Rally Day here which was hugely supported.. he makes popcorn and is sending a bunch over along with a signed banner to our troops over there.. maube i can get in touch with him and see what help he can be... i hope others , i know others will jum p in and sdo what they can...get training soldier.. lets get thsi on the road, so to speak.. ranrad
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RCAF,CAF, converted RCR?,1RCR 74-77 CD: SSM (Nato);CPSM,;UN-Cyp.; UN- Golan
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BJ MacLean
B.J. / Rusty
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Tim
Give me more details on your plan, it sound like something I would get involved with.
BJ
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B.J. MacLean
35 Yrs
Always a Proud Royal
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Mike Blais
SSM (NATO Bar), CPSM, UN-Cyp, CD
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A ROYAL CANADIAN "NEVER PASSES A FAULT"
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Canadian soldiers cited for bravery under fire
Craig Offman, National Post
Published: Tuesday, October 02, 2007
Summit was the code name for a treacherous southern Afghan road.
Constructed near the mud-walled town of Pashmul, the five-kilometre highway in the Panjwai district wasn't like the old roads: muddy and narrow and littered with roadside bombs. Wide and flat, the new highway would make it difficult for Taliban fighters to ambush without being seen. It would also provide better access to the area, bolstering the local economy.
On Oct. 3, 2006, members of the Royal Canadian Regiment Battle Group's First Battalion -- also known as the Royal Canadian Dragoons -- were attacked by Taliban forces as they built the road.
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A vicious 10-minute skirmish, the Battle of Pashmul claimed the lives of two Canadians and wounded eight soldiers, including three Americans. But it would also earn five commendations for bravery from Governor-General Michaelle Jean, who announced the Mention of Dispatches Tuesday.
The honour recognizes members of the Canadian Forces on active duty for their distinguished service.
Early on in that sweltering autumn day, members of ISTAR (or Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance Squadron) noticed some farmers working in the grape fields and amid the tall, stringy marijuana plants. The farmers had disappeared before an offensive called Operation Medusa, but had recently returned.
A month before, NATO forces launched Medusa in an effort to clear the area of Taliban insurgents. An American colonel, Stephen Williams, was famous in the area for blasting the music of the heavy metal band AC/DC while shelling Taliban fighters out of their trenches and sniper positions. A fundamentalist stronghold that once subdued Soviet forces, the insurgents from the area vanished or died.
When the clearing ended, farmers were invited to return. With them came the Taliban.
The Petawawa-based battalion had to be extra vigilant.
"The farmers could be picking up shovels one moment, and using rocket-propelled grenades the next," recalled Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, who was the battle group commander at the time.
What's worse, the crops gave Taliban fighters impeccable cover.
Soldiers watched to see if the farmers were the same ones they had seen the day before. They looked for abrupt changes of schedule. Any slight adjustment in routine could mean an ambush.
Captain Nicolas Forsyth remembers being watched by farmers, but then again, many people watched them. They had never seen vehicles like the Coyotes, the lightly armoured vehicles used for reconnaissance. That day, eight of them maintained a presence in the area.
At around 4.30 that afternoon, a sudden, searing volley of gunfire, mortars and RPGS from three or four separate locations exploded near one of the Coyotes, where then Lieutenant Forsyth -- who was later promoted to captain and commended by the Governor General Tuesday -- was directing his men.
One of his soldiers, Corporal Robert Thomas James Mitchell, a married father of three young children, was instantly killed in the attack. "He was one of my most outstanding soldiers," said Capt. Forsyth, who himself was debilitated by shrapnel wounds and flash burns in the attack.
Still, Capt. Forsyth managed to crawl around the vehicle. "I didn't feel anything at the time because the adrenaline was rushing and I felt I glad to do something," he said. Moments later, he maintained command, secure the area and evacuate the wounded.
The Governor-General cited others for their composure during the barrage.
Corporal Gregory Gilson, who was also wounded, provided radio situation reports and adopted a position to repel further reports.
Seriously injured and exposed to enemy fire, Private Matthew O'Meara comforted the wounded, provided for their security and also took a position to fend off insurgents.
Corporal Michael Trubela calmed the wounded, provided first aid to the critically injured and helped direct security.
Sergeant Craig Paul Gillam, 40, a married father of two who died fighting, was given a posthumous citation for his heroics.
"While we were under attack, he moved into position, and brought suppressive the enemy with gunfire until he succumbed," recalled Lt.-Col. Lavoie.
By the end of the day, air and artillery support drove the Taliban into the foliage, where they vanished. "That's their tactic: hit and run. They got lucky," said Capt. Forsyth.
The road was completed in March, 2007.
All five kilometres.
National Post
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1RCR 1977-79 Depot (Italy PL), B Coy, Mortars, Pioneers, D Coy (CFB London)
3RCR 1979-82 M Coy, Pipes & Drums, Sigs, Mortars. (CFB Baden-Soellingen)
1RCR 1982-88 Mortars. Dukes, Cyprus-Welfare NCO 84-85, Injured, WO&Sgts Mess, (CFB London)
1988-92 Med-remuster to HELL/ 35 DU, CFB Baden
1992 Medical release. God Bless you all!
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ranrad
Ron [Andy] Andrews
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:)Very well done, lads, and it is sad that much of this ,many of those soldiers will not get to see/hear, for they gave their all....may they rest in peace...ranrad
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RCAF,CAF, converted RCR?,1RCR 74-77 CD: SSM (Nato);CPSM,;UN-Cyp.; UN- Golan
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Mike Blais
SSM (NATO Bar), CPSM, UN-Cyp, CD
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A ROYAL CANADIAN "NEVER PASSES A FAULT"
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Hell of a read, lads. Part one can be found in this thread here,,,
http://xsorbit27.com/users5/thercrassociationmessageboard/index.php/topic,1629.840
Operation Medusa: The Battle For Panjwai
Part 2: Death in a Free Fire Zone
by Adam Day
An overview of Objective Rugby during the battle. 1: Near the white schoolhouse, 7 Platoon is caught in a deadly crossfire where Rick Nolan and Shane Stachnik are killed. 2: Afghan National Army soldiers and their American trainers attack to the north, toward route Comox. 3: The main company position, site of the Zettlemeyer attack that kills Frank Mellish and William Cushley. 4: Dismounted from their LAVs, 8 Platoon assaults a series of compounds.
Having just been blown up, Corporal Richard Furoy lay on the hard Afghan earth bleeding, in untold kinds of pain and probably close to shock. Beside him lay the body of his friend, Warrant Officer Rick Nolan. Enemy rounds were tearing up the ground and cracking past, slapping into the burning G-Wagon from which Furoy had just escaped.
The only Canadian soldier Furoy could see was Cpl. Sean Teal, who was frantically fighting off the enemy, who were just there--in the distance--bobbing and weaving in the high marijuana fields near the white schoolhouse, firing fat waves of bullets at the Canadians.
Furoy was the 7 Platoon medic, seconded to Charles Company from 2 Field Ambulance. When he arrived Nolan had taken him under his wing, shown him how to get by. Now Nolan was dead and Furoy couldn't have done anything about it and the situation was beyond horrible.
Over on the right flank of the Canadian advance, Sergeant Shane Stachnik was already dead and the attack was quickly turning into a self-rescue mission. Furoy kept thinking about his friend. In the midst of battle, he leaned over and squeezed Nolan's arm. 'Sorry brother, sorry,' he said.
Teal and Furoy were alone and their communications were down. Furoy was slipping in and out of awareness. He figured maybe he was finished. His feet felt like they were on fire, and his face was wet with blood. He passed out. But Teal was not letting him go; he brought him back to his senses with the butt of his rifle.
Teal placed Nolan's C8 rifle in Furoy's hands and said "Enemy 50 metres to the front, defend yourself." Furoy did.
Suddenly help arrived. In the maelstrom, Teal had managed to signal the nearest LAV, call sign 3-1 Charlie, that he needed help. Sgt. Scott Fawcett grabbed two soldiers--Cpl. Jason Funnel and Private Michael Patrick O'Rourke--and took off running through the marijuana fields.
Furoy, still lying on the ground, looked up at Funnel and saw tracers flying by his friend's face, rockets flying just overhead. Surely Funnel would die any second, thought Furoy.
Later, Funnel would say he thought the same thing about Furoy, as he watched bullets plow into the dirt around the wounded medic.
* * *
They've been to war, these Canadian soldiers, the veterans of Panjwai; they've been to a place beyond the normal world. They've seen their friends lying wounded on the ground, seen them die. And they've seen their own death: it was right there, in the rockets flying by--the end of everything. It's a place without illusions; a place where fear and courage are the same thing: live or die, you do your duty or you don't. It's a place from which any return is difficult.
Don't feel sorry for them, they don't want that. They are professional warriors and the first thing the men of Charles Company want you to know about the battle for Objective Rugby is that they didn't lose. Not on the day. Not on the mission. The attack failed and it was bloody chaos. Yes. But the task force kicked a mighty amount of Taliban ass that day. The enemy were lined up and hidden, hundreds of them, firing from three sides. And the Canadians went forward, despite it all; they faced up and went into the guns, into the rockets, they attacked.
Charles Company of The Royal Canadian Regiment is the most decorated, most bloodied company in the serving Canadian Forces. By the end of this story the unit will be worse than decimated, but even that's not the end of it. Without exception these men protect their memories fiercely--and they don't tell stories lightly--but they want you to know what they did, what they fought against.
Here is what happened:
It was Sept. 3, 2006, the second day of Operation Medusa and Charles Company was leading a hasty attack straight up the middle onto Objective Rugby, a small plot of heavily defended land in the middle of Panjwai district, Kandahar province, Afghanistan.
While this is primarily the story of Charles Company on Sept. 3 and 4, it should be known that Medusa was a huge operation--NATO's first-ever ground combat assault and the biggest Canadian-led battle in more than half a century. The plan for Medusa had Charles Company in the south acting as the hammer, with Major Geoff Abthorpe's Bravo Company in the north playing the anvil. To the east and west other coalition forces--Dutch, Danish, American--hemmed in the insurgents and attempted to block their escape routes. While the Canadian forces were mainly comprised of 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regt. out of Petawawa, Ont., there were sizeable contingents of 2 Combat Engineer Regt., Royal Canadian Dragoons, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, an ISTAR (Recce) Squadron led by Major Andrew Lussier and then, of course, there were the men with no names--Canadian and allied special forces--flitting in and out of the shadows.
Medusa was intended to counter the sizeable enemy force that had gathered in Panjwai, just a few kilometres southwest of Kandahar city. Historically, this is notorious land for those foreigners who try to exert influence on southern Afghanistan. The British suffered heavily here as did, more recently, the Russians, who were never able to gain full control of the territory during their Afghan war in the 1980s.
Difficulty in conquering the district comes not only from its inhabitants--the birthplace of the Taliban, home of infamously intransigent Pashtun tribals--but from the terrain itself. Technically, some people call the Arghandab River area an oasis, but that image belies its strange desolation. The Red Desert lies a few kilometres south like a big giant furnace, making the air crispy dry and sucking all the moisture from the land. And so, despite the lush greenery, life is hard, the people are hard, even the dirt is hard.
The landscape around Objective Rugby is a guerrilla fighter's paradise, crafted by literally generations of insurgents to be the ultimate redoubt. There are interconnected systems of irrigation ditches that look pretty much like a deep, wide trench system. Plus, real trench systems and fortified compounds and tunnels and endless bisecting treelines and fields of corn and dense marijuana growing so high you could only see the antennas of the Canadian vehicles as they moved around the battlefield.
And Rugby, centred on the white schoolhouse, was right at the centre of all the insurgent activity. So, it was a tough nut, perhaps the toughest. And everyone knew it. This is not hindsight, it was foresight: several sources report that the Canadian-produced intelligence at battle group and brigade level indicated that Rugby was the enemy's main defensive position in Panjwai. But beyond the intel, the enemy position on Rugby was something proven in Canadian blood on Aug. 3, one month prior, when the PPCLI lost four soldiers in their aborted attempt to take the white school.
* * *
It was early on the morning of Sept. 2 and Charles Company had seized Masum Ghar and Mar Ghar, both highpoints overlooking Objective Rugby and the area around Pashmul. As the RCR LAVs lined up and began blasting insurgent targets across the river, the engineer troops, led by Lieutenant (now Captain) Justin Behiels, began plowing new routes down into the riverbed.
Looking north from Masum Ghar, Rugby had several key features. A small road festooned with enemy bombs and mines--dubbed route Comox/Vancouver--hemmed in the objective from the east and north. To the west lay the white schoolhouse. And to the north just a few hundred metres was the village of Pashmul proper, which would have to be cleared as well.
But before they ever got to that stage, there were many problems, a great giant stack of problems for Major Matthew Sprague to solve. The initial task was how to get his force across the Arghandab River and onto the objective.
* * *
Now, one thing to know about Sprague is that he is a leader. He doesn't dither or vacillate. What he says will happen, happens. But he has that other quality indispensable to leaders: he cares about his men like nothing else and they know he will be loyal. As a result, his men don't snipe at him, even subtly, and they don't question him.
If you are to get a sense of the battle--the wild misfortune and endless calamity of it all--you have to picture Sprague at the middle of the chaos, trying to orchestrate two things at once: rescue his wounded soldiers from the battlefield and find a way to counter, on the fly, the huge enemy force that had them all trapped and pinned down.
And that's the other thing you'll have to picture, constantly, is what the atmosphere was like there on the ground, with hundreds of enemy soldiers firing insane amounts of incoming from three sides and the even greater amounts of Canadian outgoing fire, including almost constant coalition artillery, close air support and suppressing fire from Charles' 9 Platoon up on Masum Ghar.
* * *
Though the Arghandab River was shallow at this time of year, the riverbed itself was very wide, about 1,000 metres in some places. The force going across was comprised of Charles' 7 and 8 platoons complete, a group of engineers, a small convoy of Afghan National Army soldiers with their American embedded training team, an American route clearance team and Sprague's tactical headquarters, which included a forward air controller to help guide coalition air support.
A lot of the soldiers knew the enemy would expect them to cross here, but the assault force had few options. The only place with overwatch that morning was right there, right in front of Masum Ghar. And they had to avoid Comox/ Vancouver, so they were channelled from the very beginning.
They crossed the river without incident, made their breaches and moved up into the fields beyond. Scattered on the ground were the leaflets dropped there by NATO, warning the locals that an operation was coming through. The locals had also been warned over the radio and all the local Afghan troops knew the plan as well. This was no surprise attack.
Before going across, the soldiers had heard from higher that the enemy had abandoned their positions on Rugby. Despite the rosy warning, many of the soldiers felt something was up, their 'spider-senses' were tingling. But as yet there wasn't a shot fired and no sign of the enemy force hidden a few hundred metres away.
The place they made initial beachhead was about the size of a football field. It was hemmed in to the north and east by route Comox and to the West by berms, ditches and high marijuana fields. Things got briefly confused here, as at first, 7 Platoon had struck off to the north and run into route Comox. Seeing this, Sprague got on the net and ordered them to reorient themselves back toward the school directly. The platoon then passed through company lines to spearhead the attack on the school.
After the engineers made their second set of breaches, 8 Platoon's leader, Lieut. Jeremy Hiltz, (who has since been promoted to captain) stood on the berm that bordered the main company position and watched Nolan ride through the ditch in the passenger seat of a G-Wagon, Nolan jokingly pressing his face up against the glass as if he were trying to escape. Then Hiltz saw Sgt. Shane Stachnik cross the ditch in a crouch. Stachnik gave him a funny look, as if to say 'this is crazy, but let's do it.'
Capt. Derek Wessan gave a quick set of orders to 7 Platoon, who were to move through the engineer's breach and shake out into a battle line with the four LAVs--3-1 Alpha, Bravo and Charlie, plus the engineer section in Echo 3-2 Alpha--slightly in front of the G-Wagon, call sign 3-1 W, which the soldiers who rode in it jokingly liked to call 3-1 'woof,' for the last noise you'd hear as the vehicle was engulfed in flames. They were to advance to within 30 metres of the white schoolhouse, then halt and observe. Wessan, a hulking, tirelessly competent man, would normally have been riding in his own LAV, but it had broken down and was in for repairs, so he rode in the back of 3-1 Charlie instead.
The four LAVs crept up through the breached irrigation canal and into the marijuana fields, which were so dense the drivers and gunners were having a hard time seeing through their sights. Behind them the G-Wagon bumped through the breach, followed by Sprague himself in call sign 3-9er, who'd come forward to add firepower, in case it was needed.
In 3-1 Charlie, Fawcett was observing the situation from the rear sentry hatch and, seeing they were about 30 metres from the schoolhouse, ordered his driver to stop. Seconds later Fawcett saw two things happen almost simultaneously. To his right, Echo 3-2's turret seemed to explode into pieces. He ducked down to report to Wessan what he'd seen. Then, to his left, he could see Teal waving his hands and yelling behind the G-Wagon, which was blackened and smoking.
Fawcett jumped quickly back down from the hatch into the belly of the LAV, where he gave Wessan an update and reported that he was heading for the G-Wagon. "Follow me," Fawcett yelled to O'Rourke and Funnel, before taking off in a sprint down the back ramp.
Running through the marijuana towards the G-Wagon, the noise of the guns was deafening and the enemy fire was shredding the tall plants. It was raining marijuana on the sprinting soldiers.
* * *
Moments before, in the G-Wagon's rear passenger side seat, Cpl. Furoy was leaning forward, trying to get a good look at his digital camera's rear display. He'd just passed the camera to Nolan, who'd taken some pictures and now wanted to know if there were any good ones.
Suddenly everything exploded. Furoy's first thought was that his camera had somehow detonated in his hands. But it hadn't. It was probably an RPG and it hit the front of the G-Wagon and exploded through the windshield, right into Nolan's face and chest. Shrapnel tore Furoy's shoulder apart and badly wounded the Afghan interpreter sitting to his left.
Now, with O'Rourke and Funnel treating Furoy and the interpreter, Fawcett and Teal put their attention to fighting off the enemy. Before long, Fawcett ordered his guys to take the wounded back to 3-1 Charlie, which they did one at a time, traversing the distance twice under heavy fire, an act of bravery that resulted in a Medal of Military Valour for both soldiers.
Despite his own wounds, once inside the LAV Furoy began caring for other wounded soldiers, something he would do right until he was evacuated from the battlefield several hours later.
* * *
Fawcett and Teal were now alone with Nolan's body at the G-Wagon.
The incoming and outgoing, literally hundreds of weapons firing at once, was deafening. At the G-Wagon, the rounds were coming in from three sides, even spraying underneath the vehicle. Lying on the ground, Fawcett thought to himself: 'If the enemy rounds are coming under the G-Wagon, then why am I lying on the ground?'
He jumped up and yelled for Teal to do the same and they used the back of the vehicle for cover.
A few dozen metres to their left, 3-1 Bravo's main gun jammed after firing just a few rounds, Master Corporal Sean Niefer sat up in the hatch, exposed to enemy fire, laying down a barrage of his own from the turret-mounted machine-gun. For those who saw Niefer up in the turret, totally exposed as bullets and rockets flew in against him, this image would become almost emblematic of the whole battle. Niefer received the Medal of Military Valour.
On the right flank, Echo 3-2--Stachnik's LAV--was looking pretty bad. For a few scary moments, everyone pretty much thought the vehicle was a catastrophic kill. Its turret had not only been blown to pieces, but it wasn't moving and there was no radio traffic coming from it.
Almost immediately, a rescue operation was launched to get Echo 3-2 hooked up and pulled out of the kill zone. Just as a soldier was about to attach the cable, Echo 3-2's driver regained consciousness and had the presence of mind to reverse out and drive up the rear of the battle line, leaving the soldier holding the cable, standing in the field.
The first place Echo 3-2 stopped was at Sprague's LAV, where Cpl. Derick Lewis and M.Cpl. (now Cpl.) Jean-Paul Somerset jumped out to begin treating casualties. Lewis climbed up onto the LAV and after finding Stachnik was dead, moved on to begin treating the wounded crew commander.
Just moments before, Lewis had seen something very rare--an actual enemy fighter running in the open, just about 75 metres in the distance. He raised his rifle and put his eye to the sight and fired. His first shot missed. He fired again, and again. The enemy fighter crumpled and fell dead.
Some guys remember well, and for some it gets hazy. Lewis is a whole other story. He remembers these events in crystalline detail, recounting shot-by-shot, second-by-second events like they happened 25 minutes ago.
Now though, Lewis had switched to first aid instead of fighting. Almost out of nowhere, an American soldier, a medic embedded with the Afghan National Army, showed up and began to help with the casualties. Once it was clear they were all taken care of, Lewis volunteered to take the American back to friendly lines and so the two began a massive long-distance run across basically the entire battlefield, some 700 metres each way for Lewis. While the two were pinned down once on the way to the American position, and Lewis was blown off his feet on the return trip, they both made it without a scratch.
* * *
Across the radio, Sprague had begun to organize 7 Platoon into a retreat out of the encircled kill zone and back to company lines.
To this end, 3-1 Bravo pulled up to the G-Wagon and dropped its ramp. Fawcett began dragging Nolan's body towards it. The first soldier out of the LAV saw the situation and stopped dead in his tracks near the bottom of the ramp and the soldiers behind piled into him.
In short order they loaded Nolan inside and were about to take off. Quickly, Fawcett saw it wasn't going to work, the LAV was packed to the roof and there was no room left. Fawcett looked at his fellow section commander, Sgt. Brent Crellin, and made a pretty hard choice. "Get out of here," Fawcett yelled to Crellin, over the sound of battle. He and Teal would stay, fight, try to find another way out.
Crellin hit the switch to raise the LAV's ramp. "Good luck," he shouted to Fawcett.
Teal and Fawcett then moved back to the rear of the burning G-Wagon and began firing at the enemy again.
Despite being in the relative safety of the LAV's armour, 3-1 Bravo was about to find a whole new kind of misfortune. Cpl. Jason Ruffolo was the LAV driver. Now, Ruffolo is the kind of guy you want on your side in a fight. From the look in his eye, the way he holds his head, you just know he's going to be there when he's needed. With rounds crashing off the LAV, Ruffolo took off at speed through the marijuana field and, missing the single breach, slammed heavily into the irrigation ditch, which was eight to 10 feet deep.
At first, when they crashed into the ditch, all Ruffolo could hear were people screaming on the intercom and his immediate thought was that he'd killed the whole section.
* * *
So now things had gotten even more complicated. Not only was 7 Platoon caught in a wild crossfire, three of their six vehicles were either partially or totally out of the battle.
But this wasn't even the only action going on. Far on the left flank, beyond the kill zone where 7 Platoon was stuck, 8 Platoon was fighting a woolly battle to secure a group of compounds down by the bank of the Arghandab. The platoon had dismounted from their LAVs and were fighting compound-to-compound, kicking down doors and clearing rooms, gunning down enemy fighters.
On the far right flank, the ANA soldiers had been launched into a marijuana field and were fighting north toward route Comox. While undoubtedly aggressive, the ANA were kept kind of quarantined from the main force, basically holding the northern flank, because nobody was sure of their weapons control and the risk of friendly fire was too high.
Meanwhile, back at the G-Wagon, Teal and Fawcett were still in the fight of their lives. At least half a dozen rocket propelled grenades screeched past and the pair were running out of ammunition. With no good options left, Fawcett and Teal took off on a hundred-metre sprint to get back to 3-1 Charlie. They made it in one piece, despite the odds. Teal received the Star of Military Valour; Fawcett the Medal of Military Valour.
* * *
There is more than one kind of insurgent in Panjwai. First, there are the part-timers. These guys are mostly farmers or young men with nothing better to do. Maybe the Taliban pays them to fight, maybe drug lords pay them to fight, maybe they chose to fight for their own reasons. In general, these guys are amateurs. They do things like fire an AK-47 at an armoured column and then try to get away by running across an open field. LAV gunners have little trouble picking these men off, so, they don't last long.
A rough estimate going into Op Medusa was that maybe as many as half of the bad guys in the district were part-timers. A big part of the reason for this is that, through a series of blunders and corruption scandals, the local government had angered everybody to the point that Panjwai was nearly in open rebellion.
However, at the other end of the enemy spectrum there are the A-listers. The all-star team. These guys have command and control. They have tactics. They stage co-ordinated attacks. They're devious and they're not that easy to kill. By all accounts, the force currently pounding Charles Company were the serious shooters, the A-team.
Intel reports would later confirm that the Canadians blasting away at the muzzle flashes did kill dozens of these guys--maybe more, including one reputed medium-level commander.
* * *
With the evacuation of the forward position underway, the objective was now all about extracting 3-1 Bravo from the ditch.
In the ditch, Ruffolo, could hear the 'ting ting ting' as small arms fire hit the LAV and he felt the vehicle rock as first one and then a second RPG slammed into the rear hatch area.
The plan was to tow it out using a dozer. In order to do this, two soldiers were ordered to get out and hook up 3-1 Bravo's tow cable. In the confusion though, they couldn't find the cable, which had been stored on the front of the vehicle. Seeing this, and not wanting to stay trapped in the kill zone any longer, Ruffolo himself got out of the driver's seat and, exposing himself for several perilous minutes, hooked up the cable. But the heavy vehicle wouldn't budge, it was no use--the LAV wasn't moving. The order came down to abandon 3-1 Bravo, and slowly the men trapped in the back--several suffering badly after the crash--began to crawl out the hatch as the ramp couldn't be lowered. Ruffolo got out again, this time to unhook the tow cable from the LAV, allowing the dozer to churn off, the cable dragging behind it.
Ruffolo, now without a vehicle, ran up to another LAV, but they told him there was no room left. So, with no other options, he ran all the way back through the breach to the company position on his own.
In 3-1 Charlie, which was on scene to help the recovery, Wessan turned to Fawcett and said he was going to see if everyone escaped from 3-1 Bravo. Fawcett swears that Wessan covered the 20 metres to the irrigation ditch in a single leap.
Nolan's body was still in 3-1 Bravo, stuck in the ditch.
* * *
Now, just as Sprague was gearing up for the counter-attack, two things happened almost simultaneously which effectively cost the Canadians the battle for Objective Rugby.
Back in the main battle position, a hasty casualty collection point had been formed by Cpl. Lewis in the shelter of the big Zettlemeyer front-end loader and a big loose pile of dirt. While still under heavy enemy fire, the place seemed safe enough that no one really expected what came next.
The big round--probably from an 82-mm recoilless rifle--crashed into the side of the Zettlemeyer. The blast killed Pte. William Cushley pretty much outright. Funnel felt the heat of the blast and the next thing he knew he was on the ground 15 feet away. Lewis too caught the blast hard and was knocked sprawling, his arm and leg torn open. Company Sergeant Major John Barnes was also knocked down by the concussion, heavily injured. WO Frank Mellish was there too, he'd come around from 8 Platoon's flank to see if he could help extract Nolan. By all accounts best friends, there was no way Mellish was going to stay back in this situation.
Mellish was blown back away from the Zettlemeyer, badly wounded. Ruffolo had just arrived on the scene and immediately began first aid, out in the open, with no cover and enemy bullets cracking all around. Ruffolo tried to stop the bleeding, he worked furiously, but after a few minutes he realized Mellish was gone.
Just a few feet away, Funnel picked himself up off the ground after the blast and immediately saw Lewis crawling, obviously badly wounded, in the wrong direction.
"I'm hit. I'm hit," Lewis yelled.
Funnel yelled at him that he was going the wrong way, going into the bullets instead of behind cover.
Just then, already wounded, a bullet ripped into Lewis' arm, jerking it out from under him. His first thought was 'F--k, I just got shot' and the next thing he knows someone is grabbing him around the waist, lifting him up and dragging him to safety. It was Funnel.
* * *
At about the exact same moment the rocket hit the casualty collection point, Sprague heard the 'bombs away' call as a coalition aircraft dropped in on a nearby enemy position. Everybody knew the bomb was coming, they just didn't expect the 1,000-pound-laser-guided weapon to land on their heads. But it did, pretty much. The bomb landed just north of the main position and bounced in toward the ANA and the Canadians, coming to rest just metres in front the company's tactical headquarters.
Sprague saw it and his first thought was that it was over for the lot of them.
In the engineer LAV, the driver called up Lieut. Behiels, the engineer leader, on the intercom.
"Um, sir, a giant bomb just landed right in front of us," he said.
"We're still alive," Behiels replied. "Keep firing."
No explanation was ever found for what went wrong. It was just one of those things.
* * *
With the right flank closed off by the 1,000-pounder, and the casualties piling up, there were few choices left except to get out and try again later. But there was one more thing to do. Sprague wasn't going to lose any more men retrieving Nolan's body, but he wasn't going to leave him there either.
So on his orders, pretty much the entire force faced forward and laid down an absolute barrage of suppressing fire, leaving just one thin corridor for an 8 Platoon LAV to make the perilous run up to 3-1 Bravo and retrieve Nolan's body.
That was the last piece of business Sprague thought they could accomplish, and with that done, they started to withdraw back to the middle of the Arghandab.
* * *
As everyone was gathering up for the withdrawal, there was one further, final misfortune. As Hiltz was doing a check on the men of 8 Platoon, to ensure everyone was accounted for, he discovered that one section was still out in the compound on the left flank. One way or another, their section commander had ended up back at the LAV without them and now it was up to Hiltz to go get his men.
With just a quick glance, Wessan, who had appeared suddenly beside Hiltz but had misplaced his rifle in the chaos, signalled he was good to go as well and the two of them took off.
Wessan hit the berm first with Hiltz still sprinting across the field behind him, cursing the heavy radio in his backpack for slowing him down.
The two officers, platoon leaders, stood on the berm at the forward edge of the position, with enemy bullets cracking past. They could hear the trapped soldiers screaming for help. Hiltz raised his C8 and fired towards the flashes. Wessan fired his Browning pistol and the two of them hoped the covering fire, such as it was, would give the trapped section the courage to get up and get out of there. They did.
Charles Company headed back across the Arghandab and back onto Masum Ghar. During the night they traded fire with insurgents and watched as coalition aircraft destroyed the vehicles they'd abandoned earlier.
* * *
In their official reports on the day--gained by Legion Magazine through Canada's Access to Information program--the military calls what happened on Objective Rugby an ambush. In some sense, that's true, but largely it is not. On Aug. 3, the PPCLI were ambushed at the schoolhouse. Calling Sept. 3 an ambush is sort of like calling what happened at Dieppe an ambush. A small Canadian force was sent on an attack against a numerically superior enemy in a well-established defensive position.
That said, nothing is certain. It's impossible to know whether the decision to commit to the attack on Rugby 48 hours in advance of the schedule cost lives or saved them. However, military minds are trained to grapple with probabilities, and while nothing is certain, it's hard to see how two days of heavy air strikes, direct fire and tactical manoeuvres could have failed to weaken the enemy.
In the end, it just didn't make sense to the soldiers. Here we have one plan, long developed and founded on encirclement, deliberate tactical advance and careful attrition of enemy forces in a well-established free fire zone, working at cross purposes with a run-and-gun frontal assault which depended more on surprise and the enemy's weakness than Canadian strength. While perhaps either tactic might have worked, using both didn't make sense.
The enemy knew the Canadians were coming, because the leaflets told them. There was no attempt at deception because deception wasn't a part of the plan.
The enemy was surrounded, cut off and wildly outgunned. As one soldier said, quietly, as if it were no big thing, 'we held all the cards, and we played their hand.'
Sometimes you get the bear, sometimes the bear gets you.
* * *
Ultimately, the battle that day, in the bright Afghan sunshine, lasted about four hours--the force moved out at about 6 a.m. and the retreat began at about 9:20 am, which is known to be the exact moment Cpl. Lewis was injected with morphine, as it's written on his helmet cover, which he has kept all this time but plans to maybe donate to his local Legion one day.
While the battle cost the lives of four Canadian soldiers and wounded 10 others, if you want to know the hidden cost of this battle, and of this mission, all you have to do is sit down and talk to the veterans and you'd know a couple of things. First is that you can often hear the experience in their voices--they crack and waver a bit when they talk about these events. Second, and this is the dead giveaway, you can see it in their eyes. They look around, down, up at the ceiling, often wincing, as if the story itself was causing pain. Sure, they still laugh, and they tell funny stories about the day, but they describe it almost like it happened to somebody else. Maybe that's what they have to do.
As for the others, the one's who escaped without physical injury, while they don't wear wound stripes on their uniforms, many of them seem to carry that place in their head like it's a piece of shrapnel. While these injuries are unseen, they are no less real.
And while many would like to forget, others want to remember. Like Ruffolo, when he came home he got a tattoo on his neck to remember his buddy Cushley. He takes endless crap for it from the Army, but he doesn't care. He did it for his dead friend, to remember.
* * *
?While Medusa started badly for Charles Company, it got worse the next morning.
In just a few seconds, the pilot of an American A-10 Thunderbolt close air support fighter made a mistake that cost one more life--Pte. Mark Anthony Graham, a former Olympic sprinter--and wounded more than 30 others, some badly, including Sprague himself.
In the early morning haze, the pilot had mistaken a garbage fire lit by the Canadians for smoke from an enemy position and, lacking vital situational awareness, fired his fierce 30-mm chain gun at the unsuspecting target.
When the plane struck, Ruffolo was just over a rise with 7 Platoon. The plane hit 8 Platoon and the tactical headquarters. Ruffolo came running over the hill and saw what looked to him like a mass grave--men lying everywhere, pools of blood, and just unbelievable carnage. He thought the whole platoon was dead.
For Sprague, right in the middle of the friendly fire incident, it was like watching a whole bunch of sparklers going off while he got the crap kicked out of him. What he remembers most is the concussion--or rather the amount of concussion--kind of like getting punched in the nose a hundred times really hard.
Sprague suffered serious shrapnel wounds to the head and body and was evacuated to Germany and then back to Canada, alongside several of his men.
* * *
Charles Company was done. They'd lost their commander, a great chunk of their junior leadership and almost 50 soldiers in total. For a short time there, the unit was combat ineffective, and where it used to be Medusa's hammer, it now largely disappeared. The emphasis would now shift to Bravo Company, the new hammer, striking down on Rugby from the north.
As for Charles Company, not all of its soldiers were out of the fight. Wessan would stay in the field and his patched together force, against all odds, would be among the first Canadians on Objective Rugby when it eventually fell to the battle group, 10 days later.
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1RCR 1977-79 Depot (Italy PL), B Coy, Mortars, Pioneers, D Coy (CFB London)
3RCR 1979-82 M Coy, Pipes & Drums, Sigs, Mortars. (CFB Baden-Soellingen)
1RCR 1982-88 Mortars. Dukes, Cyprus-Welfare NCO 84-85, Injured, WO&Sgts Mess, (CFB London)
1988-92 Med-remuster to HELL/ 35 DU, CFB Baden
1992 Medical release. God Bless you all!
Pro Patria
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ranrad
Ron [Andy] Andrews
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A very good read Mike...really good, gets one in as close as one would want to being there,and given the choice soldiers would want to be there and yet not want to be there...these brothers did a heck of a top job...i can only salute and thank them all...ranrad
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RCAF,CAF, converted RCR?,1RCR 74-77 CD: SSM (Nato);CPSM,;UN-Cyp.; UN- Golan
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Mike Blais
SSM (NATO Bar), CPSM, UN-Cyp, CD
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A ROYAL CANADIAN "NEVER PASSES A FAULT"
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I just recieved my copy of legion magazine, the third installment is inside but it is not online yet. Once there, i shall copy and paste...
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1RCR 1977-79 Depot (Italy PL), B Coy, Mortars, Pioneers, D Coy (CFB London)
3RCR 1979-82 M Coy, Pipes & Drums, Sigs, Mortars. (CFB Baden-Soellingen)
1RCR 1982-88 Mortars. Dukes, Cyprus-Welfare NCO 84-85, Injured, WO&Sgts Mess, (CFB London)
1988-92 Med-remuster to HELL/ 35 DU, CFB Baden
1992 Medical release. God Bless you all!
Pro Patria
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Norfolk
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I had heard that what happened at that fight was bad, but not that bad.  But the boys still pulled it out.
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Shawn Stanhope
Sierra Coy, 4RCR 1991-1994
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Eli Aucoin
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Our justice system at work !!
December 12, 2007
Betsy Powell
Crime Reporter
While a judge in Kitchener doesn't think police officers should wear poppies when they come to testify in her courtroom, it doesn't appear to be part of a wider trend banning the Remembrance Day symbol.
According to a court transcript obtained by The Record of Waterloo Region, Ontario Court Justice Margaret Woolcott issued the warning to Const. Dan Haines on Oct. 31 when he appeared as a witness at an assault trial.
"However much you may think that's a totally acceptable symbol, and that is totally neutral, that might not be entirely the case for everybody who comes to court," Woolcott told the Waterloo regional police officer.
"It represents a symbol of support and I suspect that 99.999 per cent of us happily wear it outside the courtroom. You probably should not wear anything like that in court."
While she didn't insist Haines remove it that day, she told him she would in the future.
At Ontario Superior Court yesterday, no one could remember a judge there making such an order.
Sgt. Brian Thornton, a Toronto Police Service liaison officer who's been based at the 361 University Ave. courthouse for the last six years, said: "It's never been an issue here."
However, over at Old City Hall, one court security guard shrugged when asked if he'd ever heard about anyone being asked to remove a poppy.
"It's the judge's courtroom. He can do what he wants."
After the Oct. 31 proceeding, police and judicial representatives held a closed-door meeting and the issue has been resolved, Insp. Brian Larkin told the Record.
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Mike Blais
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A ROYAL CANADIAN "NEVER PASSES A FAULT"
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I had heard that what happened at that fight was bad, but not that bad. But the boys still pulled it out.
Yes they did. The third installment is most dramatic.
Here is a version that I culled from the regimental website.
Op MEDUSA - A Summary
By: Captain Edward Stewart, the Task Force 3-06 Battle Group PAO, was the Forward PAO for Operation MEDUSA.
PANJWAII DISTRICT, KANDAHAR PROVINCE - Commencing with twenty-four hours of aerial bombardment and artillery fire, closely followed by both mounted and dismounted advances and culminating with re-population and reconstruction, Op MEDUSA was a textbook example of Full Spectrum Operations in complex terrain. With a Battle Group comprised of four companies, one artillery battery, one ISTAR Squadron, one engineer squadron, elements of the Afghan National and United States Armies plus air support, it was likely also the largest Canadian combat operation since the Second World War.
Although Op MEDUSA began on 2 September 2006, its origins stretched back to OP ARCHER, Roto 1. In July of 2006 Task Force ORION began to note a marked increase in insurgent activity in the Panjwaii district. On August 3rd, four members of the Task Force ORION lost their lives in the vicinity of Pashmul, in the Panjwaii District of Kandahar Province. Leadership at ISAF's Multi-National Brigade South (MNB(S)) recognized that a polar shift in insurgent behavior was taking place. Insurgents, who had long relied on small-unit attacks and ambushes throughout the area of operations, were starting to tie themselves to a single piece of ground.
"It's classic stage-three of an insurgency," explained Lieutenant Colonel Omer Lavoie to his planning staff. As commander of the Task Force 3-06 Battle Group, which is centred around 1st Battalion, The Royal Canadian Regiment (1 RCR), primary responsibility for clearing Panjwaii would ultimately fall to him. According to the writings of Mao Tse Tung, explained LCol Lavoie, stage three of an insurgency indicates that the forces feel strong enough to both tie themselves to a piece of ground and to mass in large numbers. "Basically, they want us to become decisively engaged," said LCol Lavoie.
By the time the first elements of Task Force 3-06 began arriving in theatre in late July and early August, it was clear that the insurgent forces in the Panjwaii District were going to be the main focus of operations right from the start. "I have to admit that this is not where I expected to be," explained LCol Lavoie in an interview. "For the last six months I trained my battle group to fight a counter-insurgency, and now find that we are facing something a lot more like conventional warfare." He added, "Fortunately my troops are well-trained in both."
On August 19th, at around 4:00 P.M. local time, Transfer of Command Authority (TOCA) took place in a small ceremony at Battle Group Headquarters, Kandahar Airfield (KAF). LCol Ian Hope, Commanding Officer of Task Force Orion (centered on 1st Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry) passed on command to LCol Lavoie. LCol Hope spoke to his troops about their many accomplishments. TF ORION had been in close to a hundred firefights, had manoeuvred all over Kandahar and Helmand Provinces and had lost some of their comrades in battle. To the incoming soldiers LCol Hope expressed his confidence that they would be able to take up the reigns without difficulty, and warned of the intractable nature of the enemy they faced.
LCol Lavoie then spoke of his confidence in his battle group and thanked TF ORION for the outstanding work they had done in theatre since January 2006. With that, authority had been transferred and planning staff at both Battle Group and Brigade began refining the plan for Op MEDUSA.
Any doubt as to the nature of the threat that TF 3-06 faced was put to rest within hours of TOCA taking place. Alpha Company of TF 3-06 BG was operating in the Panjwaii District, in the vicinity of Patrol Base Wilson, when roughly 70 insurgents were detected. The deployment of A Coy likely caused the insurgents to attempt an attack and various assets identified their movement. A Coy engaged with their LAV III's and, aided by Combat Air Support, they inflicted heavy casualties on the insurgents without becoming decisively engaged. The encounter clearly highlighted the advantages the Canadian BG had at its disposal: the ability to fight at night, unmatched firepower and soldiers trained to the point where they were able to adapt rapidly to situational changes with lethal effect.
Over the last two weeks of August a pattern emerged. The insurgent forces were clearly looking for a fight, and wanted to draw NATO forces into a battle. Convoys were continually ambushed and Patrol Base Wilson was constantly mortared.
By the end of August, however, shaping operations in preparation for the main phases of Op MEDUSA had begun in earnest. "We will decisively engage them at a time of our choosing," explained LCol Lavoie during a media scrum. "They [the insurgents] have a certain amount of influence there at the moment, but they cannot manoeuvre and we can."
The insurgents in Panjwaii District represented a very real thorn in NATO's side. By staking themselves so boldly to a piece of terrain they were making a very real statement of intent. Moreover, they were also attempting to generate an information operations victory on Kandahar City, only a short drive to the east. It would be next to impossible for NATO to implement an agenda of reconstruction with the insurgents essentially camped out on the doorstep. Security aside, the population of Kandahar Province, and indeed Afghanistan, would never buy into reconstruction unless this threat was dealt with.
A greenbelt with a maze of fields between Highway One and the Arghandab River and surrounded by rugged hills, Panjwaii had twice been the location of Muhjahadeen victories over the ill-fated 40th Army during the Soviet invasion in the 1980's. Melons, grapes, pomegranates and marijuana all grew there. The fields, and the endless compounds, ditches and canals made it ideal defensive terrain with a self-sustaining food supply.
With all that in mind, battle staff at Brigade and Battle Group created a condition-based plan to clear the eastern pocket of the Panjwaii District. Aerial reconnaissance assets gave lucid pictures of enemy movement and precise movements and specific goals marked the plan for Op MEDUSA. By the end of August, the TF 3-06 Battle Group, along with the Afghan National Army, US, Dutch and (later) Danish forces was at the start lines both north and south waiting for H-Hour. The BG had seized Bazari-Panjwaii by fire and was well forward waiting for the bombardment.
Using leaflets and media briefings, Brigade staff issued a warning to all non-combatants who lived in the Panjwaii District to leave immediately. Civilians streamed out of the area leaving the insurgents fixed in place, and alone, waiting for the attack that they had essentially asked for.
As the ISAF main effort, Op MEDUSA had tremendous combat air support (CAS) at its disposal. At first light on September 2nd bombardment began. In both the north and the south, waiting ground forces watched as artillery and aerial salvos rained down on insurgent forces destroying clusters of enemy, their command and control nodes and their re-supply.
Controlled by Forward Observation Officers (FOOs), Canadian artillery made up of Echo Battery (E Bty), 2nd Regiment Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, fired hundreds of 155mm rounds into the area of operations. E Bty was located some 10 kilometers north of the battle space in the Artillery Manoeuvre Area (AMA). Under the command of Major Greg Ivey, E Bty had the tremendous power of four M777 howitzers at their disposal. Apache attack helicopters from the Netherlands and United Kingdom prowled on station firing rockets and 30mm cannon fire on targets as they were called in. Harrier's of the Royal Air Force and F-16 Falcons of the Royal Netherlands Air Force struck with 500 pound bombs, and B-1B Lancer bombers of the United States Air Force dropped in precision-guided munitions from 15,000 feet and higher.
Bombardier Richard Hannam was the driver for the FOO attached to Alpha Company (A Coy). His job was to drive the LAV III that carried both the FOO and the Forward Air Controller (FAC) responsible for calling in both artillery and combat air support. "At times we were less than 400 meters from the explosions," explains Bdr Hannam. "It was definitely 'Danger Close!'" Bdr Hannam was in the south during the first days of Op MEDUSA. "It was a real eye-opener....high paced...and a fast tempo." After some thought Bdr Hannam adds, "I know a lot of people who train thinking they will never do it. I never thought I would use my training over here like this and it's a kind of fulfillment, doing what you train to do."
As this bombardment took place Charles Company (C Coy) under the command of Major Matthew Sprague, and Alpha Company (A Coy) under the command of Major Mike Wright of TF 3-06 BG waited in the south. Along Highway One, Bravo Company (B Coy) under the command of Major Geoff Abthorpe provided a screen in the north. With each company engineers of 23 Field Squadron (23 Fd Sqd), 2nd Combat Engineer Regiment (2 CER) under the command of Major Mark Gasparotto prepared to conduct breaching tasks.
On September 3rd the forces in the south moved forward towards insurgent positions, but the day was marked by tragedy. As C Coy advanced across the Arghandab River and onto their objective three soldiers from 1 RCR and one engineer from 2 CER were killed in battle. Warrant Officer Richard Nolan, Warrant Officer Frank Mellish, Sgt Shane Stachnik (2CER) and Private Jonathan Cushley died in battle with the insurgents.
On the same day, a RAF Nimrod reconnaissance aircraft crashed with the loss of all on board. ISTAR Squadron, Royal Canadian Dragons under the command of Major Andy Lussier was immediately moved in to secure the crash site in advance of an RAF ground team.
Despite these terrible losses, the insurgents were being reduced. Aerial bombardment and artillery fire along with fire from LAV III's and Coyote reconnaissance vehicles was taking its toll. The Canadian capability to operate in darkness was proving to be a decisive advantage as insurgents were engaged from distance in the darkness. Various intelligence sources were indicating that in the first two days the insurgents had suffered tremendous losses.
On September 4th, calamity struck C Coy once more when an A-10 Thunderbolt of the United States Air Force mistakenly engaged them. C Coy suffered one dead, former Olympic athlete Pte Mark Graham, and upwards of 30 wounded -including several senior NCOs and the Company Commander, Major Matthew Sprague.
Corporal Jason Plumley, a Dragoon attached to 23 Fd Sqn, said, "I had been off to the side and heard the (A -10) sound. I hit the ground, and when I got up I saw all the [injured] laying there."
Major Steve Rankin, an Army Lessons Learned Officer from Land Forces Doctrine and Training Systems (LFDTS) observed that even though the scope of the mishap was huge, training prevented it from getting any worse. "Soldiers immediately went into their first aid drills," observed Rankin. "The medics performed triage and did it quickly." Cpl Plumley's assessment was identical, "without hesitation everyone moved in at once to tend to the casualties." Much credit for this response was given to the Tactical Combat Casualty Care Course (TCCC). The troops all agreed that this course had provided excellent prep for what they had to deal with.
Aerial medevac was quickly on site. In less than 36 hours, C Coy had essentially lost its leadership at both the officer and NCO level. All four of its Warrant Officers had been either killed or wounded. Captain Steve Brown, the 2IC was suddenly in charge of a company that had a Corporal acting as Company Quartermaster (CQ), and a Sergeant as Company Sergeant Major (CSM).
In the north, soldiers of B Coy could only sit in frustration knowing that their comrades in C Coy were in trouble in the south. "We had sort of felt left out from the start," explained Corporal Mike Blois, of 1 Section, 4 Platoon, B Coy. "We knew from the radio what was going on, and we knew the PPCLI guys in Alpha would jump in to help, but these were guys from our regiment."
A lull in ground operations ensued. The north, along highway one, was to become the main effort of the operation. In the first days of the operation, B Coy had faced south. Numerous small engagements had taken place as insurgent forces attempted to engage with small arms and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs), and were repulsed each time. In one instance, two insurgents attempted to sneak in close to attack with RPG fire and were quickly destroyed.
On September 5th five members of Bravo Company were injured when they were engaged by mortar fire on the western edge of their screen. They had been re-supplying their LAV with rations and water when the mortaring began. The opportunistic nature of the attack highlighted the ability of the insurgents to watch and wait for certain behavior patterns before striking.
Since September 2nd, the north had been fairly quiet. Patrol Base Wilson (PBW), in the Zahri District Centre was the Forward Supply Base for operations in the north. Just off of Highway One and a scant 3 kilometers north of the Arghandab River, and a little less than a kilometer from a tree line that separated friendly territory from enemy.
Barely 150 meters square, PBW was the hub of re-supply and maintenance as well as the location for the forward command post. Jointly administered by Captain Simon Parker (Forward Supply Element) and Captain Greg Losier (Military Police) the population of PBW would change rapidly throughout each day as supply convoys came and went, and as soldiers and vehicles came in to re-supply re-arm. Medics from Health Service Support Coy (HSS) were always available to tend to everything from minor health complaints, to heat stroke to combat wounds.
A surprisingly small number of troops from the National Support Element (NSE) and BG would keep the supplies flowing and vehicles working. Medics dealt with all nature of injuries ranging from shrapnel, to heat exhaustion to gastro-intestinal ailments. The NSE has deployed a Forward Support Element (FSE) under the command of an infantry officer, Captain Parker. The FSE consisted of 14 soldiers from the NSE including Supply Technicians, Ammunition technicians, Transport personnel, Maintainers for weapons, fire control systems, communications and vehicle technicians.
The FSE assumed control of Patrol Base Wilson and from there quickly established a Combat Service Support (CSS) node well forward, which provided continuous support to the troops in contact throughout the operation. The FSE also attached Mobile Recovery Teams to each company to provide integral maintenance and recovery close to the forward edge of battle. The FSE coordinated continuous resupply convoys both by ground and air to companies engaged in battle no matter the location. From the rooftops, staff at PBW could see the effects of the bombardment, as well as a stream of non-combatants moving north to a refugee camp and safety.
Patrol Base Wilson was also the location of a forward command post. Under the command of Battle Group Deputy Commanding Officer, Major Marty Lipcsey, a small staff of duty personnel monitored and many time directed the operation as circumstances dictated.
LCol Lavoie noted that one area in which the NATO forces had the insurgent forces far out-stripped was in command and control. In a very short period of time the main effort of the operation was moved to the north. As forces were redeployed up north, reconnaissance patrols were sent out almost daily as the plan was adjusted. Captain Steve MacBeth, the Recce Platoon commander noted, "on a lot of mornings they [the insurgents] would wake up to find our footprints all over the place." Intelligence reports noted that the artillery fire and air support, which had been unceasing since September 2nd, was taking its toll as the insurgents were finding it very hard to re-supply and maintain control.
On September 6th B Coy breached the treeline that marked the divide between friendly and enemy territory. With the breach in place, a systematic move south began. With the aid of outstanding aerial maps, and with Recce looking ahead each night, the BG began moving south in a methodical manner in a series of forward passage of lines.
"It was almost like running a Recce Course," said Corporal Don Leblanc of 1 RCR's Recce Platoon." Added Cpl Leblanc, "the difference is that we had all the assets we could ask for and more. We hadn't done much basic recce work in the work-up training, but our initial training kicked in and we went back to basics."
With recce leading the way, and preceded by artillery and air support companies would move south, engage in firefights, seize, clear and secure objectives and then wait for the next forward passage of lines. Troops from the Canadian BG, a US company drawn from the | | | |
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